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Abstract. The research in argumentation has produce systems with a
human-like mechanism for commonsense reasoning. One form of repre-
senting arguments is called Argumentation Schemes, in which are argu-
ment forms that represent inferential structures of arguments used in
everyday discourse, and in special contexts like legal argumentation, sci-
entific argumentation, and especially in AI. One type of argumentation
scheme corresponds to appeal to Expert Opinion or Position-to-Know
argumentation. Position-to-know reasoning is typically used in an infor-
mation seeking type of dialogue where one has to depend on a source.
Most of such argumentation frameworks are based on Dung’s seminal
work characterizing Abstract Argumentation Frameworks. In this work
we introduce a novel framework, called Expert Argumentation Framework
(EAF), extending AF with the capability of modeling the quality of
expert associated with the arguments that proposed.
1 Introduction
Argumentation research has contributed with a human-like mechanism to
the formalization of commonsense reasoning. In a general sense, argumentation
can be associated with the interactive process where arguments for and against
conclusions are offered, with the purpose of determining which conclusions are
acceptable. Several argument-based formalisms have emerged, with application
in many areas such as legal reasoning, recommender systems and multi-agent
systems [2, 3, 7].
Argumentation Schemes [8, 9] offers the possibility of representing arguments
in a semi-formal way; in this argument forms inferential structures of arguments
used in everyday discourse are represented and in special contexts such as legal
argumentation, scientific argumentation, and AI systems in general. This simple
device allows to represent arguments in a form that is closer to natural language
usually used to represent them in free text. A particular type of argumentation
scheme corresponds to appeal to Expert Opinion or Position-to-Know argumen-
tation. In the latter, reasoning is typically used in an information seeking type
of dialogue where it is necessary to depend on a source.
Most argumentation frameworks are based on Dung’s seminal work charac-
terizing Abstract Argumentation Frameworks (AF) [4]. We present a proposal
to formalize an argument schemes proposed by Walton [8–10]; to formalize the
argument scheme we start from the framework proposed by Dung as an abstrac-
tion of a defeasible argumentation system. In argumentation framework (AF ),
an argument is considered as an abstract entity with unspecified internal struc-
ture, and its role in the framework is completely determined by the relation of
attack it maintains with other arguments.
In our work, we proposed an extension called Expert Argumentation Frame-
work (EAF), to allow the representation of an expert, the properties associated
with it, and the association of a particular expert with an argument. For that, we
extend the AF framework to a 4-tupla Θ = 〈AR,EXP,ATTACK,ASSERT 〉,
where EXP represent a set of experts or proponents and ASSERT represent
a function that relates the experts with the arguments. By defining the set of
experts or proponents (EXP) we consider the six basic critical questions match-
ing the appeal to expert opinion offered by Walton, that support this argument
scheme.
The central contribution of this paper is the increase in the ability to rep-
resent and model the quality of an expert associated with the arguments that
proposed; to that effect we will extend Dungs framework appropriately. Next, we
will introduce Dung’s abstract argumentation in Section 2, then we will briefly
present argument schemes in Section 3. In Section 3 we will introduce our pro-
posal, ending the paper in Section 5 with some conclusions and an outline of
some possible future work.
2 Abstract Argumentation
Dung [4] introduced the notion of Argumentation Framework (AF) as a conve-
nient abstraction of a defeasible argumentation system. In an AF , an argument is
considered as an abstract entity with unspecified internal structure, and its role
in the framework is completely determined by the relation of attack it maintains
with other arguments; thus, the only elements in the AF are a set the arguments
and the attack relation defined among them. The following definition captures
this abstract entity.
Definition 1 (Argumentation Framework [4]) An argumentation framework
(AF ) is a pair 〈AR,Attacks〉, where AR is a set of arguments, and Attacks is
a binary relation on AR, i.e., Attacks ⊆ AR×AR.
Given an AF, an argument A is considered acceptable if it can be defended,
using arguments in AR, from all the arguments in AR that attack it (also called
attackers). This intuition is formalized in the following definitions, originally
presented in [4].
Definition 2 (Acceptability) Let AF = 〈AR,Attacks〉 be an argumentation
framework.
- A set S ⊆ AR is called conflict-free if there are no arguments A,B ∈ S such
that (A,B) ∈ Attacks.
- An argument A ∈ AR is acceptable with respect to a set S ⊆ AR iff for each
B ∈ AR, if B attacks A then there is C ∈ S such that (C,B) ∈ Attacks; in
such case it is said that B is attacked by S.
- A conflict-free set S is admissible iff each argument in S is acceptable with
respect to S.
- An admissible set E ⊆ AR is a complete extension of AF iff E contains
each argument that is acceptable with respect to E.
- A set E ⊆ AR is the grounded extension of AF iff E is a complete extension
that is minimal with respect to set inclusion.
Dung [4] also presented a fixed-point characterization of the grounded se-
mantics based on the characteristic function F defined below.
Definition 3 Let 〈AR,Attacks〉 be an AF . The associated characteristic func-
tion F : 2AR → 2AR, is F (S) =def {A ∈ AR | A is acceptable w.r.t. S}.
The following proposition suggests how to compute the grounded extension
associated with a finitary AF (i.e., such that each argument is attacked by at
most a finite number of arguments) by iteratively applying the characteristic
function starting from ∅. See [1, 6] for details on semantics of AFs.
Proposition 1 ([4]) Let 〈AR,Attacks〉 be a finitary AF . Let i ∈ N∪ {0} such
that F i(∅) = F i+1(∅). Then F i(∅) is the least fixed point of F , and corresponds
to the grounded extension associated with the AF.
Example 1 Consider the AF 〈AR,Attacks〉 (graphically represented in Fig. 3), where
AR = {A,B,C,D,E, F,G} and Attacks = {(B,A), (C,B), (E,A), (G,E), (F,G), (G,D)}.
The set S = {C,D,E, F} is admissible, since it defends all the arguments it contains. S
is also complete since it contains all the arguments in AR defended by S. Finally, it can
be verified that S is the minimal set satisfying the previous conditions, and therefore it
corresponds to the grounded extension of AR. Next we show how to obtain the grounded
extension by applying the fixed point characterization from Prop. 1. F 0(∅) = ∅
F 1(∅) = F (∅) = {C,F}
F 2(∅) = F ({C,F}) = {C,F,D,E}
F 3(∅) = F ({C,F,D,E}) = F 2(∅)
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Fig. 1. Argumentation Framework
3 Argumentation Schemes
Argumentation schemes [8, 9] are argument forms that represent inferential
structures of arguments used in everyday discourse, and in special contexts like
legal argumentation, scientific argumentation, and especially in AI. Deductive
forms of inference like modus ponens and disjunctive syllogism are very familiar.
But some of the most common and interesting argumentation schemes are neither
deductive nor inductive, but defeasible and presumptive.
When the arguments are not deductive or inductive, are said defeasible argu-
ments. These arguments are inherently presumptive, and thus they are different
in nature from deductive and inductive arguments. Each of the forms of this
argument is used as a presumptive argument in a dialogue that carries a weight
of plausibility. In the case that, the respondent accepts the premises then that
gives him a good reason also to accept the conclusion. But it does not mean that
the respondent should accept the conclusion uncritically, each form of argument
is a set of appropriate critical questions to ask.
In a given case, there may be a balance of considerations to take into account,
there may be some arguments in favor of the conclusion and some against it.
These forms of inference are called argumentation schemes, and they represent
many common types of argumentation that are familiar in everyday conversa-
tions.
One type of argumentation scheme corresponds to appeal to Expert Opin-
ion or Position-to-Know argumentation. Position-to-know reasoning is typically
used in an information seeking type of dialogue where one has to depend on a
source. Where a is a source of information, the following argumentation scheme
represents the form of position-to-know argumentation(see Figure 2):
– Is a in a position to know whether A is true (false)?
– Is a an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source?
– Did a assert that A is true (false)?
Is a in a position to 
know whether A is true 
(false)? 
Is a an honest 
(trustworthy, reliable) 
source? 
Did a assert that A 
is true (false)? 
a in a position to 
know whether A 
is true (false) 
a assert that A is 
true (false) 
A is true (false) 
Fig. 2. Argumentation Scheme - Position-to-Know Argumentation
The form of argument can be plausible, but it is also defeasible. It can be
critically questioned in a dialogue by raising doubts about the truth of either
premise or by asking whether a is an honest (trustworthy) source of information.
The second critical question concerns the credibility of the source.
The appeal to expert opinion, sometimes also called argument from expert
opinion, is an important subspecies of position-to-know reasoning. It is based on
the assumption that the source is alleged to be in a position to know about a
subject because he or she has expert knowledge of that subject.
Appeal to expert opinion should, in most typical cases, be seen as a plausible
but defeasible form of argumentation. The six critical basic questions matching
the appeal to expert opinion are listed below [8]:
1. Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?.
2. Field Question: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?.
3. Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?.
4. Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?.
5. Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?.
6. Backup Evidence Question: Is E assertion based on evidence?.
The idea behind using critical questions to evaluate appeals to expert opinion
is dialectical. The assumption is that the issue to be settled by argumentation
in a dialogue hangs on a balance of considerations. One can critically question
an appeal to expert opinion by raising doubts about any of the premises.
4 Argumentation Framework of a Argumentation
Schemes that appeals to Expert Opinion
In recent years the field of application of the argument has been expanded. In
addition, there have been numerous studies to demonstrate the value of argu-
mentation schemes. However, no investigations have been developed enough to
formalize the structures of these schemes . In this section, we will make a first
approximation of this formalization through an extension of AF called Expert
Argumentation Framework (EAF), that takes in consideration the quality of
expert that proposed the arguments.
We define EAF as a 4-tuple Θ = 〈AR,EXP,ATTACK,ASSERT 〉 where:
– AR is a set of arguments,
– ATTACK is a binary relation of attack between arguments belonging to the
set AR,ATTACK ⊆ AR×AR
– EXP is the set of experts or proponents who put forward an argument,
– ASSERT is a function defined as ASSERT : EXP → AR, that determines
which expert claims or wields what argument.
We define the component EXP of the tuple presented, based on the scheme
proposed by Walton [8–10].
Definition 4 Let EXP a set of expert. We defined a expert Xi ∈ EXP as a
4-tuple Xi = (Q,C,B, S) where:
– Q denotes that the argument comes from a qualified expert in the subject.
– C denotes that the argument comes from a trusted expert.
– B the argument of the expert is better than any argument from any expert.
– S the argument is safe, able to overcome an argument from another expert.
We say that, each argument ofAR is associated with the propertiesQ,C,B, S.
Note that, the presence of a properties is represented by 1 and the absence of
a properties is denoted by 0. For example, the arguments A ∈ AR can be as-
sociated with an expert X1 where X1 = (1, 1, 0, 0), i.e., the expert X1 has the
properties Q and C.
Now we expand the definitions of Dung [4], broadening conflict-free set and
acceptable element definitions.
Definition 5 (Exp-Conflict-Free) A set S ⊆ AR is called exp-conflict-free if
there are no arguments A,B ∈ S such that (A,B) ∈ Attacks, and whether such
arguments are put forward by the same or different expert, formally must hold
the following points:
@ A,B ∈ S and (Xi, A) ∈ ASSERT and
(Xj , B) ∈ ASSERT | (A,B) ∈ ATTACK, with i = j or i 6= j.
Definition 6 (Exp-Acceptable) An argument A ∈ AR is acceptable with
respect to a set S ⊆ AR iff for each B ∈ AR, if B attacks A then the experts
who put forward it are different, formally:
If A ∈ S ∧ B ∈ AR, (X1, A) ∈ ASSERT , (X2, B) ∈ ASSERT and
(A,B) ∈ ATTACK,then X1 6= X2.
Once expanded the definitions of conflict-free set and acceptability of an item,
we can define the acceptability of a set of arguments.
Definition 7 (Exp-Acceptability) Let Θ = 〈AR,EXP,ATTACK,ASSERT 〉
be an expert argumentation framework. The acceptability of a set S of arguments
such that S ⊆ AR, is given by the following conditions:
- A set S ⊆ AR is a Exp-Conflict-Free.
- An argument A ∈ AR is a Exp-Acceptable with respect to a set S ⊆ AR.
- An Exp-Conflict-Free set S is admissible iff each argument in S is acceptable
with respect to S.
- An admissible set E ⊆ AR is a complete extension of EAF iff E contains
each argument that is acceptable with respect to E.
- A set E ⊆ AR is the grounded extension of EAF iff E is a complete exten-
sion that is minimal with respect to set inclusion.
Example 2 Consider the EAF 〈AR,EXP,ATTACK,ASSERT 〉, where:
AR = {A,B,C,D,E, F,G}
EXP = {X1 = (1, 1, 1, 1);X2 = (1, 1, 0, 0);X3 = (1, 1, 0, 1)}
ATTACKS = {(B,A), (C,B), (E,A), (G,E), (F,G), (G,D)}.
ASSERT = {(X1, C); (X1, F ); (X2, A); (X3, B); (X3, D); (X3, E); (X3, G)}.
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X1 ASSERT F 
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Fig. 3. Expert Argumentation Framework
In this example, we define a Exp− Conflict− Free set S = {C,F}. These
arguments are put forwards for the same expert and do not attack each other.
However, the set S′ = {B,D,E,G} is not considered Exp − Conflict − Free
because the argument G attacks the argument E, although they are advanced by
the same expert. In this example, we can find another Exp − Conflict − Free
set S′′ = {A}.
With regard to Exp − Acceptable, we can say that A ∈ AR is acceptable
with respect to S′′ ⊆ AR because the arguments B and E attack A, and A is
put forwards by X2 while B and E are advanced by X3. But if we consider the
argument E ∈ AR is not acceptable with respect to S′ ⊆ AR because G attacks
E, and both are put forward for the same expert. As for the arguments C and
F , not be attacked by other arguments, we believe that these are acceptable ar-
guments.
Now, consider the conflict-free sets S ⊆ AR and S′′ ⊆ AR. In these sets
the arguments do not attack each other, so we can say that both S and S′′ are
admissible. We can not analyze the admissibility of the set S′ because it is not
a conflict-free set.
The admissible set S is complete extensions of EAF ,because S contains each
argument that is acceptable with respect to S. The same applies to the set S′′.
We can not say the same of the set S′ as this set is not admissible.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Argumentation has contributed to the study and formalization of commonsense
reasoning with a human-like mechanism. In a general sense, argumentation can
be associated with the interaction of arguments for and against conclusions,
with the purpose of determining which conclusions are acceptable. One form of
advancing in the representation of arguments is called Argumentation Schemes.
In this paper we presented a novel formalism for appeal to Expert Opinion or
Position-to-Know argumentation scheme proposed by Walton [8, 9], formalism
is understood as an extension of AF Dung [4]. The main extension is to consider
as part of this formalism the characteristics required of an expert and the rela-
tionship between an expert and the arguments put forward by him. For this we
have proposed EAF as a 4-tuple Θ = 〈AR,EXP,ATTACK,ASSERT 〉. This
tuple contains a set of arguments, a set of experts or proponents to put forward
arguments, attack relations between arguments, and a function that determines
who put forward the argument.
The expert is described by the use of other 4-tuple that contains the proper-
ties which characterize the expert according to Walton[8] and can take the value
0 or 1: Xi = (Q,C,B, S). We apply EAF extension to a simple example that
contains three major subsets of arguments. These subsets are defined according
to the expert who wields the arguments. The set S corresponds to the Expert
X1, S
′ corresponds to the expert X2 and S′′ corresponds to the expert X3. We
note that in one of the sets there are arguments that attack, which is useful to
differentiate the application of the extended definitions.
As lines of future research, first it is necessary to refine the definition of
the 4-tuple containing the properties of the expert, so it does not considers
just a binary value giving the possibility that these properties can be weighted.
Secondly, we need to analyze and study the extensions to the classical semantics
proposed by Dung within the proposed framework. Also, it seems necessary to
formalize other argumentation schemes also proposed by Walton [8], since little
research has been done over the formalization of their structures; that will open
the possibility of further implementation with Defeasible Logic Programming.
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